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### **Integrity Compliance Report**

### Ministry of Economy and Trade Pilot Project – Consumer Protection Department December 2015 – June 2016



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	Executive summary
)	Findings
	Best practices
	Recommendations

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# SeD could not define a CP anti-corruption strategy due to the unavailability of data

Corruption risk assessment	Best practices learning	Anti-corruption strategy
Assess the level of corruption within the entity:	Identify general anti- corruption trends by:	Develop an anti-corruption strategy and implementation
<ul> <li>Conduct employee surveys</li> <li>Shadow inspectors on the job</li> <li>Conduct customer surveys<sup>(1)</sup></li> <li>Identify loopholes in the operating model<sup>(2)</sup> (e.g., governance and processes)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Learning from success stories</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>plan for the Ministry, e.g.:</li> <li>Identify anti-corruption initiatives</li> <li>Get leadership buy-in on these initiatives</li> <li>Detail anti-corruption initiatives</li> <li>Develop communication plan</li> </ul>
1) Consumer Protection did not provide Sed with a list of business 2) Due to unavailability of data, SeD was not able to analyze the C بَلّغ عن الفساد لَيَصير ع		Due to the lack of collaboration of the ministry's employees and the unavailability of data highlighted in three different letters, an anti-corruption strategy could not be defined and the project was put to a stop

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# The survey conducted with 68 employees of the Ministry led to 3 key findings

**Overview of the survey** 

#### Objective

 Assess Ministry's integrity and governance at institutional, managerial and individual level

#### Approach

 45 questions delivered via a face to face interview

#### **Participants**

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- 68 employees in Beirut (32% of total employees)
- Representation across several departments (e.g., Diwan, Consumer Protection, Intellectual Property, Trade)

#### Key findings

Ministry's leadership is perceived to be willing to fight corruption and leading by example

Anti-corruption policies, processes and
 governance are weak / non-existent
 within the ministry



Several types of corruption visible in the Ministry



# While shadowing 17 field inspectors, we identified key gaps in service delivery and potential for corruption

#### Institutional weaknesses

Under- equipped inspectors	<ul> <li>Inspectors are under-equipped, ranging from transportation to the tools allowing them to determine the prevalence of fraud</li> <li>They mostly relocate to other ministries since they do not enjoy sufficient guarantees</li> </ul>
Lack of collaboration between entities	<ul> <li>Evident overlap of powers between ministries concerned about CP (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Economy and Trade, Ministry of Tourism) leading to unclear areas of accountability</li> <li>Lack of cooperation and coordination between ministries or municipalities</li> </ul>
Limited productivity of inspectors	<ul> <li>Although the number of inspectors has increased by 500% in the past 7 years, the output of the CP department did not: 120 reports were made in 2009 while 342 reports were made in 2014</li> <li>There is no performance management system to assess the performance of inspectors</li> </ul>
Absence of long term contracts	<ul> <li>There are no official ministry labs - the ministry signs annual contracts with private labs</li> <li>This constitutes a drain on its budget and creates a great potential of corruption</li> </ul>
Conflicts of interest	• The existence of an <b>ambiguous relations between municipalities and generator owners</b> , drawing from <b>overlapping interests</b> between the two stakeholders, makes it difficult for the ministry of Economy to protect consumers with regards to private generator pricings who tend to overprice without accountability
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# The survey conducted with key stakeholders in private institutions led to 3 key findings

#### Institution-level surveys

#### Objective

 Assess information availability and transparency, services provided and integrity perception in relation with quality and speed of service

#### Approach

- 68 questions delivered via a face to face interview
- Sample: 200 institutions (100 chosen randomly and 100 from the Ministry's list)

#### **Participants**

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 75/100 institutions in Beirut targeting distribution, import, export, electronics, food, beverage, gas stations and generator owners



Ministry's leadership is perceived as lacking integrity

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The Ministry's procedures are perceived as lacking transparency

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In addition, a number of issues were identified through our interaction with the department's employees

#### **Observations**

- Lack of transparency in the department's activities
- Arbitrary selection of businesses to inspect
- Probable notification of businesses prior to inspection
- Absence of information on follow-up activities (judicial, police, etc.)
- Inadequate statistics on inspector performance
- Inadequate statistics allowing analytical solutions / preventive measures to recurring infractions
- Lack of monitoring of progress vs. complaints received

### متكراركانة Quick win solutions could be implemented at low cost to improve the performance of the Consumer Protection's department

#### Institutional weaknesses

Technology	<ul> <li>A number of secure low-cost applications can be developed to digitize the inspectors' reporting</li> <li>Inspectors would enter their activities and reports on a centralized system, making the performance assessment and follow-up manageable</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>A revision of the CP's smartphone application would help attract consumers and increase their willingness to raise complaints and provide information</li> </ul>
Culture	<ul> <li>A culture change program is required to modernize the approach and behavior of the ministry's employees emphasizing:         <ul> <li>Anti-bribery and corruption policies (84% of employees reported never attending such a training)</li> <li>Meritocracy and performance</li> </ul> </li> <li>Leading by example is a must and change has to be visible and encouraged top-down</li> </ul>
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Capabilities	<ul> <li>52% of surveyed businesses were not satisfied with the level of knowledge of inspectors and their educational capabilities – training the employees would also increase their morale and motivation</li> <li>Inspectors should be provided with means of transportation or protection when they visit remote and risky areas/businesses (i.e., generators)</li> </ul>

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Ministry's leadership is perceived to be willing to fight corruption and leading by example



Corruption risk

assessment


believe that the Minister and its team are working towards a more transparent and corruption-free Ministry, however pessimistic about the success

84%

believe that the Ministry's leadership is leading by example

29%

claim that transparency is not clearly stated in the Ministry mandate and objectives





<sup>2</sup> Anti-corruption policies, processes and governance are weak / nonexistent within the ministry



Corruption risk

assessment

never attended anti-corruption trainings

62%

claim that there are no code of conduct or guiding principles against corruption

46%

claim that there are no processes in place to report corruption

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### Several types of corruption visible in the Ministry



#### witnessed corruption

30%	witnessed employees being pressured to conduct an activity
23%	witnessed employees deliver services that do not meet the customer needs
22%	claim that employees put their personal needs before the Ministry's
22%	witnessed bribery
20%	witnessed employees delivering wrong information to customers

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In addition, we shadowed 17 field inspectors in order to identify gaps in service delivery and potential for corruption

Overview of the "shadowing inspectors" research piece

#### Objective

Corruption risk

assessment

- Evaluate performance motivation and degree of tolerance towards corruption
- Compare regulations to practices and identify gaps in the servicedelivery
- Link and analyze corruption mechanisms

#### Approach

 Field inspections covered several areas of interest: restaurants, shops, supermarkets, gas stations and generators

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### 5 key findings were identified

Corruption risk

assessment

#### Institutional weaknesses

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# We conducted a survey with key stakeholders in private institutions resulting in 3 key findings

#### Institution-level surveys

#### Objective

Corruption risk

assessment

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#### **Participants**

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Ministry's leadership is perceived as lacking integrity

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
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The Ministry's procedures are perceived as lacking transparency





Q18: In the past 5 years, have you noticed any change in the MoET's inspector's behavior?



others

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Corruption risk

assessment



Q33

Q34

Q36

### Ministry's leadership is perceived as lacking integrity



52%

Corruption risk

assessment

believe that the recruitment system in the ministry is not based on the principle of merit and efficiency



believe that the senior officials and staff of senior management will be more willing to accept a bribe, compared with employees in the lower ranks and administrative staff

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
Corruption risk

assessment

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The Ministry's procedures are perceived as lacking transparency



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In general, a few improvement opportunities were mentioned

Improvement opportunities mentioned

Increase awareness and education of shops and big institutions

Clarify the different duties of the ministry of health and the MoET

Simplify procedures (e.g., in terms of time)

Enforce penalties and regulations

Have the right person at the right position

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Corruption risk

assessment



1	Executive summary
2	Findings
3	Best practices
4	Recommendations

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
	Qatar	France	Canada	Dubai	Lebanon
Specialised organism	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\sqrt{\sqrt{4}}$	$\checkmark$
Own website	×	$\checkmark$	×	$\checkmark$	×
Selection/Training of agents	N/A	$\checkmark\checkmark\checkmark$	N/A	$\checkmark$	×
Salary of agents	N/A	$\checkmark\checkmark\checkmark$	N/A	$\checkmark\checkmark\checkmark$	×
Surveys publications	$\sqrt{\sqrt{\sqrt{1}}}$	$\sqrt{\sqrt{\sqrt{1}}}$	$\sqrt{\sqrt{\sqrt{1}}}$	$\sqrt{\sqrt{\sqrt{1}}}$	$\checkmark$
Visibility about legal regulations	$\sqrt{\sqrt{\sqrt{1}}}$	$\checkmark\checkmark\checkmark$	$\checkmark\checkmark\checkmark$	$\checkmark\checkmark\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Relations with local specialised associations	$\checkmark\checkmark\checkmark$	$\checkmark\checkmark\checkmark$	$\checkmark\checkmark\checkmark$	$\checkmark\checkmark\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Follow-ups of sanctions/inspections	$\sqrt{\sqrt{\sqrt{1}}}$	$\sqrt{\sqrt{\sqrt{1}}}$	$\sqrt{\sqrt{\sqrt{1}}}$	$\sqrt{\sqrt{\sqrt{1}}}$	$\checkmark$

Best practices learning



# Different mechanisms should be used concurrently in order to minimize risks of corruption

Mechanism	Impact
Independent anti-corruption institution	Creating a strong institution capable of effectively implementing anti- corruption initiatives
Strong policing	Ensuring compliance with anti-corruption measures through targeted enforcement activities
Corruption proof processes	Eliminating any loopholes in current processes that allow corruption
Innovative technologies	Leveraging of world-class technology solutions to fight corruption
Motivated staff and engaged public	Strengthening the capability, commitment and awareness of anti- corruption agents as well as of the general public and public agents
Strict regulation	Strengthening corruption related regulation



Source: Sakker el Dekkene analysis



### A number of initiatives can be found along each of those dimensions



#### Independent anti-corruption institutions

- Set-up a strong institution capable of effectively implementing anticorruption initiatives
- Define objective, governance and operating model of such an institution

Targeted use of technology

- Develop e-government initiatives to enhance the efficiency and transparency of public administration (e.g., e-Procurement)
- Implement analytical tools to identify data anomalies (e.g., finance) نَلْخَوْنِ الفُسادِ لَبَصِدِ عِنَّا بَلَدِ

### Strong policing

- Set-up strong policing unit to investigate and monitor corrupt behaviors
- Facilitate close & regular collaboration between Ministry of Interior and policing unit

#### Motivated staff and engaged public

- Develop anti-corruption training courses (e.g., behaviors in corruption prone situations) for government staff
- Launch anti-corruption campaigns to raise public awareness



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- Review and indentify loopholes in current processes that allow corruption
- Develop new processes to eliminate corruption (e.g., recruitment, finance)



### Strict regulation

- Identify loopholes in current regulations
- Develop new and strict regulations against corruption







### Case study: Hong-Kong

	Mechanism	Initiatives taken by Hong Kong
	Independent anti-corruption institution	<ul> <li>Established the Independent Commission Against Corruption in 1974</li> </ul>
1	Strong policing	<ul> <li>Dedicated teams of experts (e.g., surveillance experts forensic accountants) to monitor and capture any fraudulent activities</li> </ul>
N R R R N N	Corruption proof processes	<ul> <li>Developed a checklist for internal operations prone t corruption (e.g., tendering process, payment procedures recruitment guidelines)</li> </ul>
A.	Innovative technology applications	<ul> <li>Monitored corruption suspects through the use of technology (e.g., monitoring systems, cameras, financia tools)</li> </ul>
	Motivated staff and engaged public	<ul> <li>Attracted and retained top talent through a competitive value proposition</li> <li>Created several anonymous whistleblowing channels</li> </ul>
Ť	Strict regulation	<ul> <li>Strengthened anti-corruption laws and implemented a zero tolerance law enforcement</li> </ul>

Hong Kong effective initiatives positioned it as one of the least corrupted countries according to TI<sup>1</sup> (#17/174 in 2014)

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### Case study: Qatar (Middle East Award For Consumer Protection 2015)

	NON EXHAUSTIVE
Specialized organism	The Consumer Protection Sector at the Ministry of Economy and Commerce
Own website	CPS has its own space in the MEC's website – very clear and complete – Updates News often
Social networks	Facebook, Instagram no Twitter
Hotline/SMS	Free Hotline + SMS + email address + online complaint
Surveys publications	<ul> <li>2015 report highlights:</li> <li>4,573 complaints were received and all were addressed</li> <li>1,302 businesses surveyed</li> <li>275 infractions to consumer protection standards</li> <li>74 goods were removed from market</li> <li>19 sales points were closed for infraction (fraud, display of expired products, etc.)</li> </ul>
Visibility of legal regulations	Law n°8 2008 available on the Internet + On the MEC website/CPS section: Consumer tips / Consumer Rights / Smart Consumer Secret / Supplier Obligations sections very clear and detailed
Relations with local specialized associations	<ul> <li>The website explains the importance of interacting closely with the civil society</li> <li>MEC launched logistics and storehouse projects over an area of 9mn sqm, which would be implemented through partnerships between the government and private sector companies. The first phase of such projects is already being implemented</li> </ul>
Follow sanctions/inspections	<ul> <li>Suppliers who breach any of the provisions of the law may face "detention for a term not exceeding two years and fine".</li> <li>The fine has recently been increased in an amendment Law (14) of 2014 from one of between 5,000 and 10,000 Riyals to one of between 3,000 and 1 million Riyals. This penalty doubles if the supplier repeats the offence within five years of the original infringement</li> <li>If the supplier fails to advise of a dangerous commodity the fine has been amended to one of between 15,000 and 100,000 Riyals to one of between 15,000 and 1 million Riyals (excluding suppliers who unintentionally advertise incorrect information if it is determined that the information provided was too technical to verify)</li> <li>Law No (14) of (2011) further adds that violating shops can be closed by up to three months where repeat violations occur</li> </ul>

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NON EXHAUSTIVE




2 Findings	e summary		
3 Best pra			
	ctices		
4 Recomm	endations		


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The ministry should move as soon as possible towards a solution providing an easy to read dashboard



### A transparent solution would increase the participation of the consumer, and help restore the trust with the ministry



- Existing application: the existing application offers consumer the possibility to file a complaint, with no further opportunity to follow up, read reviews about other businesses, or participate in the performance management of the CP department
- **Suggestion:** providing citizens and consumers with an interactive and up-to-date application would instill a sense of purpose and encourage them to use the app more actively and support the ministry keep a control on the businesses as well as its inspectors. The application could provide:
  - The location of the businesses inspected and their rating (number of inspections, number of infractions, performance over time, etc.)
  - A means to control the way businesses are inspected and their performance monitored

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# We recommend the tool Lifecycle – already used by ministry of administrative reform (OMSAR)


Sakker el Dekkene could train two young and dedicated team members from CP to automate the inspection procedure and develop the tools

Advantages:

- Cost effective, (few hundred dollars for a software licence)
- No need for expertise
- Solution can be built in house
- Solution can grow gradually
- First usable product within a week or two max
- Solution can work offline

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• Solution can be integrated with paper-based processes




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# Behaviors are influenced by programmatic, interactive and sustaining forces; all must be used for maximum impact

#### Mechanisms that Drive Behavior Spreading and Adoption

Sakker el Dekkene could organize one workshop per quarter with the department's leadership and top employees



	Measurement	In order to ensure early momentum is sustained, mechanisms are required to measure and disseminate results, driven by a robust internal capability that can continually monitor and adjust the program as needed
	Communications / Story Telling	
	Reminders	
	Internal capability building	



# Once identified, the critical few behaviors can be spread using a suite of mechanisms working in both directions

#### **Driving Mechanisms Top-Down & Bottom-Up**

# Engage the front-line to secure ownership and generate insight

- Exemplar Communities identifying and working with individuals who already exemplify the Critical Few Behaviors to codesign additional spreading mechanisms and engage their colleagues
- Front-line Leadership Training developing and deploying training curricula built around the Critical Few Behaviors to raise awareness and reinforce their importance among the most numerous layer of 'leaders' in the organization

Bottom Up

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